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ARGUMENT
I.

ALTERNATIVE MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT
A.

The Reckless Disregard Determination Inherently Requires a Comparison of
Stacey's Conduct With That of Ludwig and Athay.

When this lawsuit was initially filed, the Plaintiff alleged that three officers, Gregg Athay
("Athay"), Chad Ludwig ("Ludwig") and Rich County Sheriff Dale Stacey ("Stacey"), caused or
contributed to the Plaintiffs injuries based on their actions taken in participating in the pursuit.
Under Idaho law, these officers were only liable to the Plaintiff if their actions amounted to
"reckless disregard." I.C. § 49-623. Athay and Ludwig were dismissed from the suit after this
Court determined that neither one of these officers acted with reckless disregard. The Court's
analysis of these officers' actions is critical not only because it defines certain appropriate police
conduct in the context of this pursuit, but also because it requires a comparison of Stacey's
actions with those of Ludwig and Athay.

In dismissing the Plaintiffs claims against Ludwig, this Court concluded that "there is
absolutely nothing in the record showing that Deputy Ludwig operated his vehicle with reckless
disregard for the safety of others or that his conduct induced Ervin to continue fleeing at a high
rate of speed." Athay v. Stacey, 128 P.3d 897, 906-7 (Idaho 2005) ("Athay 1'). The conduct on
the record included:
1) The use of spike strips in an attempt to stop the Mustang, despite the fact that Ludwig
did not know with certainty whether the vehicle he spiked was the fleeing vehicle until
after the vehicle ran over the spikes I;

See Athay I at 907 ("[Ludwig] had not been given a description of the car he was to attempt to
stop ... but correctly assumed it was the Mustang.").
I
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2) Ludwig's joining in the pursuit during its final eight miles; and
3) Ludwig's involvement in the pursuit through Montpelier, including "fanning out," for
greater visibility.
Athay I at 907.
In Athay II, this Court concluded that the following conduct did not show that Athay
acted with reckless disregard:
1) Dispatching Ludwig to attempt to stop the fleeing vehicle with spike strips;
2) Joining the pursuit behind Stacey and remaining involved until the pursuit terminated;
3) Requesting police traffic control assistance as the pursuit passed through Montpelier;
4) Requesting that Caribou County attempt to stop the vehicle with spike strips.
Athay v. Stacey, 196 P.3d 325,333-34 (Idaho 2008) CAthay 11').
As a result of this Court's holdings in Athay I and Athay II, Stacey could not be found to
have acted with reckless disregard based upon his calling ahead to request assistance from other
police agencies, requesting that Bear Lake County attempt to stop the Mustang using spike strips,
fanning out for greater visibility through Montpelier, or continuing the final eight miles of the
pursuit. Hence the Jury's determination necessarily relied upon a consideration of how and to
what extent Stacey's actions differed from the appropriate actions of Ludwig and Athay. Only if
the Plaintiff showed that Stacey acted differently and more "recklessly" than Ludwig and Athay
could the Jury conclude that Stacey acted with reckless disregard and thereby find Rich County
liable to the Plaintiff.

Rich County raised this precise issue in the Jury Instruction Conference, asking that the Court
instruct the Jury in accordance with this Court's prior holdings as to the conduct of Ludwig and
Athay. The District Court declined Rich County's request.
2
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B.

The Plaintiff Did Not Introduce Any Evidence That Ervin Knew He Was Being
Pursued.

There is no question Stacey's conduct differed from that of Ludwig and Athay in one
material way, that being Stacey's involvement in the pursuit prior to crossing into Idaho. Since
the inception of this lawsuit, the Plaintiff s theory has been that Stacey (and the other officers)
"initiated" and encouraged the pursuit by following the Mustang at high speeds through three
states. In other words, the Plaintiff has argued that but for Stacey's continuing to follow the
Mustang, the Mustang would have stopped or slowed down because there would be nothing to
"flee" from. However, the Plaintiff did not introduce a single piece of evidence to show that
Ervin knew that he was being pursued by law enforcement on June 10, 1999 and therefore failed
to show that Stacey's conduct had any role in causing or contributing to the collision in question.
On the evening of the collision, Idaho State Trooper W.D. Jones and Ludwig interviewed
Ervin. Tr. Vol. 7, p. 62-63. In response to being informed that he was being charged with felony
eluding, Ervin claimed that he did not know who he was eluding and had not seen any police
officers that night. ld. at 63, L. 10-24. At trial, Ervin testified that he had no recollection of the
pursuit or the collision itself. Tr. Vol. 5, p. 28, L. 10-18. There was simply no evidence to
support the Plaintiff's assumption that Ervin knew Stacey was following him.
C.

The Plaintiff Failed To Prove All Elements of the Reckless Disregard Standard.

In order to prove that Stacey acted with reckless disregard, the Plaintiff needed to
introduce evidence to show: 1) Stacey's conduct created an unreasonable risk of bodily harm; 2)
Stacey knew of the high degree of probability that the harm suffered by the Plaintiff would result
from his conduct; and 3) Stacey continued his conduct despite his knowledge of the risk of harm.
Athay II at 332; see also Harris v. State, 847 P.2d 1156, 1160 (Idaho 1992).

6
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First, there was no evidence introduced at trial to prove that Stacey's actions created an
umeasonable risk of harm. Stacey attempted to stop a drunk driver based upon his erratic and
dangerous driving patterns, and upon that driver fleeing pursued the fleeing felon. For whatever
reason, the driver did not stop and continued to drive in a dangerous and reckless manner,
endangering innocent motorists in three states. Stacey neither initiated the driver's dangerous
behavior nor was there evidence that he increased the risk of harm to others. The jury could not
have appropriately concluded that the first element of reckless disregard was proven.
The Plaintiff argues that there were several facts showing that Stacey "knowing of the
inherent dangers of [the] pursuit - chose to continue the chase." Respondent's Brief, p. 36. This
statement significantly minimizes and misrepresents Stacey's testimony. While it is true that
Stacey testified that he understood and appreciated that a police pursuit involves risks, as does
any operation of a motor vehicle, he also testified extensively that he understood and appreciated
the risk of letting an intoxicated motorist and reckless driver simply drive away. Stacey weighed
the risk of these options, and determined that he would continue to follow the vehicle, but would
radio to police agencies down the road, ahead of the drunk driver, so that these agencies could
intercept the vehicle. Stacey never intended to pursue the vehicle through 3 states and there was
no evidence or testimony that Stacey was trying to "catch up" to the Mustang and stop the driver
himself. Stacey continued to radio ahead to other police agencies, fully expecting that the other
law enforcement officers he knew worked in the area would be able to stop the Mustang.
Unfortunately, it just so happened that every officer who would have ordinarily been able to help
was busy that night or was unable to respond in time.

7
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The evidence introduced at trial was not conclusive proof that Ervin's high-speed, out of
control driving was the direct consequence of Stacey's decision to continue following Ervin. 3
The Plaintiff did not introduce any testimony or evidence from any officer or expert witness that
called into question Stacey's decision to follow or continue following the Mustang. Contrary to
the Plaintiff's statement that Stacey knew the Mustang's registered owner's address during the
pursuit, all Stacey knew was that the Mustang was registered "to a Dora D. Gilgen or Billie Deen
Ellett out of Soda Springs, Idaho." Defendant's Exh. 203, p. 1. This information would not have
conclusively or directly led Stacey to the fleeing driver, particularly in light of the fact that
Stacey did not know who the driver was or if the Mustang was stolen.

D.

The Plaintiff Is Not Entitled to Attorney Fees on Appeal.
The Plaintiff requests attorney's fees pursuant to I.C. § 12-121 and I.A.R. 41, apparently

based on his argument that Rich County's appeal "merely invites the court to second guess the
findings of the lower court."4 Respondent's Brief, p. 13 (citing Crowley v. Critchfield, 181 P.3d
435,440 (2007)). The only context in which the Plaintiff has alleged that Rich County has
invited such "second-guessing" is its Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict

("JNOV"). Id., p. 33.

3 The Plaintiff argued that Ervin's slowing down through Cokeville, Wyoming and then speeding
back up again as he left Cokeville shows that he knew Stacey was behind him. Stacey testified
that he was able to catch up to Ervin when he slowed through Cokeville, so the Plaintiff's theory
was that at this point, Ervin sped up again. However, the testimony was that Ervin slowed down
to around 45 miles per hour for the whole time he drove through Cokeville. Stacey did not testify
that Ervin sped up as soon as he saw Stacey had caught up, but rather sped up when he left
Cokeville and the speed limit increased. The evidence actually tends to show that Ervin only
slowed in Cokeville to avoid being pulled over for speeding, not because he thought he had lost
Stacey.
4 The Plaintiff also states that "[a]ttorney's fees may ... be awarded under section 12-121 if the
appeal is brought or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation." Id., p. 13.
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The Plaintiff has not submitted any argument to support his alleged entitlement to
attorney's fees aside from pointing out the grounds for which attorney fees may be awarded
under I.C. § 12-121. Absent any facts indicating that Rich County's JNOV, or any other part of
this Appeal, was "brought or defended frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation,,,5 the
Plaintiff has failed to establish his entitlement to an award of fees and the Court should deny the
Plaintiff s request.

II.

MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL (Ex Parte Contacts)
A.

The Plaintiff Waived All of His Procedural Objections to Rich County's First
Motion for a New Trial.
With respect to Rich County's Motion for a New Trial ("First Motion"), the issue on

appeal is whether the District Court committed error in denying the First Motion, which this
Court will review for an abuse of the trial court's discretion. The question of whether a trial court
abused its discretion is based on three inquiries, those being whether the trial court:

"(1) recognize [d] the issue as one of discretion, (2) act[ed] within the boundaries of its
discretion and applie[d] the applicable legal standards, and (3) reache[d] the decision
through an exercise of reason."

Sun Valley Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Idaho Power Co., 803 P.2d 993, 1000 (Idaho 1991). In other
words, this Court's review for an abuse of discretion review is focused on wltat tlte district court

did with tlte information it Itad before it. Therefore, only those facts and arguments that were
before and considered by the district court should be considered on appeal.

5 "When deciding whether attorney fees should be awarded under I. C. § 12-121, the entire course
of the litigation must be taken into account and if there is at least one legitimate issue presented,
attorney fees may not be awarded even though the losing party has asserted other factual or legal
claims that are frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation." Michalk v. Michalk, 220 P.3d
580,591 (Idaho 2009) (citing McGrew v. McGrew, 82 P.3d 833,844 (Idaho 2003)). Rich County
has certainly presented numerous valid issues throughout the long history of this litigation, and
therefore the Plaintiff is not entitled to attorney fees.
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The District Court, on its own initiative, denied the First Motion based on Rich County's
"failure to support the motion with an affidavit," as required by I.R.C.P. 59(a)(1). In opposing
the First Motion, the only arguments advanced by the Plaintiff in both his briefs or during oral
argument were substantive arguments about the whether the ex parte communications had any
impact on the jury. "The rule is well settled that a party cannot avail himself of a defense for the
first time in the appellate court, nor will a question not raised in the trial court be considered on
appeal." Webster v. Potlach Forests, 187 P.2d 1, 17 (Idaho 1947) (quoting Grant v. St. James

Mining Co., Ltd., 191 P. 359,359 (Idaho 1920)).
The Plaintiff did not, in any way, object to the fact that Rich County did not file an
affidavit with its First Motion nor did he contend that Rich County's alleged knowledge of the ex
parte contacts effectively barred Rich County from asserting these contacts as grounds for a new
trial. Moreover, the Court itself never mentioned Rich County's alleged "knowledge" in its
Memorandum Decision and Order and did not inquire about it during the November 18,2010
Hearing on the First Motion. Therefore the Plaintiff cannot now argue that the lack of an
affidavit was prejudicial or that Rich County waived its objections to the ex parte
communications and the Court should not consider these arguments.

B.

The Plaintiff Was Not Prejudiced by the Fact That Rich County Did Not File an
Affidavit.
The Plaintiff's argument that he was unaware of the specific facts Rich County would

assert as grounds for its First Motion defies logic and is without merit. Rich County's
Memorandum in Support of its First Motion, filed along with the First Motion, clearly explains
that the First Motion is exclusively based on the ex parte communications that the Court
disclosed during the September 16, 2010 Status Conference. Rich County further explained:

10 ApPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF FOR RICH COUNTY, UTAH

"Defendant has no idea the subject or subjects of the conversations, no idea how many
text messages were sent and no idea if it was on a single date, over a span of days or
weeks."
R. Vol. 2, p. 317.
The facts upon which Rich County's Motion was based were obvious to the Court and
the Plaintiff. It is clear from the Supporting Memorandum that Rich County had no knowledge or
information beyond that disclosed by the Court during the Status Conference. In fact, Rich
County requested in the alternative that the Court order production of all of the ex parte
communications. There is simply no "suggestion" or indication that Rich County would assert
other facts as grounds for its First Motion.
The Plaintiffs conduct was the subject of the September 16,2011 Status Conference and
certainly he had and has the greatest knowledge of anyone besides Peck as to the nature and
extent of his improper ex parte communications. In fact, most the "details" of the ex parte
contact that were argued by Rich County actually came from the Plaintiffs Affidavit provided in
response to the First Motion. The Plaintiff cannot say, in good faith, that Rich County knew
more than he did about his own conduct and was in no way prejudiced or disadvantaged by the
lack of an affidavit "stating in detail the facts relied upon."
C.

Rich County Had No Knowledge of the Ex Parte Communications.
The Plaintiff incorrectly states that during the September 16, 2010 Status Conference,

Rich County's counsel informed the Court that "they had been was aware of contact between
[Brandy Peck ("Peck")] and [the Plaintiff], but chose not to report it." Respondent's Brief, p. 19.
In actuality Rich County's counsel, Blake Hamilton6 , stated "We did have some concerns about

Mr. Hamilton was not present during the trial with the exception of closing arguments and was
handling the telephonic status conference because Rich County's trial counsel was trying a
Federal criminal case in the Southern District of Florida at the time.
6
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the communication between Brandy [Peck] and the Plaintiff during the trial." Tr. Telephone
Conf., p. 5, L. 5-6 (emphasis added). Mr. Hamilton further clarified, "[a]s I recall the
conversations about the concerns that we had, I believe that they were at the beginning of the
trial and ... [w]e didn't notice any further continuance of those conversations. I believe that is
why it wasn't brought up then." Id. at 6-7.
Mr. Hamilton never stated that Rich County's counsel knew that the Plaintiff and Peck
were communicating several times a day, both during and after the trial day, or sending hundreds
of text messages over the course of the trial because Rich County's counsel did not know any of
those things were happening. Mr. Hamilton accurately reported that Rich County had some
general concerns stemming from Peck's courtroom demeanor and counsel's observing Peck in
the hallway with the Plaintiff outside the courtroom during a recess. These observations did not
conclusively indicate that Peck and the Plaintiff were having some inappropriate contact much
less a full-blown personal relationship as was actually the case. Rich County's concerns were
just that - concerns, not actual knowledge of the ex parte communications at issue. The
Plaintiff's suggestion is absolutely incorrect and thus his argument, even if it is not waived, is
entirely lacking in merit.

D.

Rueth's Burden-Shifting Analysis Applies to the Rich County's First Motion.
The issue raised in Rich County's First Motion is whether the Plaintiff's misconduct, that

is, his ex parte communications with the District Court's deputy clerk, prevented Rich County
from having a fair trial. In Slaathaug, the plaintiffs moved for a new trial after they learned that
the defendant insurance company provided daily trial transcripts to defense witnesses in violation
of the exclusionary rule. Slaathaug v. Allstate Ins. Co., 979 P.2d 107 (Idaho 1999). The Court
held that "where a motion for a new trial under I.R.C.P. 59(a)(1) is based upon misconduct, the
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moving party has only the burden to establish that the misconduct occurred. The party opposing
the motion must then establish that the conduct could not have affected the outcome of the trial."
Id., at 112 (citing Hinman v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 771 P.2d 533 (Idaho 1989); Rueth v. State,
596 P.2d 75,80 (Idaho 1979» (emphasis added).
The Court explained "[i]n Idaho, it is definitely not the case that the losing party has the
double burden of showing both that a ... violation has and that 'actual prejudice' has resulted."
Jd.; (quoting Rueth, 596 P.2d at 80) (emphasis in original). This approach, the Court reasoned,

makes particular sense in a case where the non-moving party's misconduct is at issue because
s/he is in the "best position to present evidence of prejudice or lack thereof." Jd., at 113.

Accordingly, once the Slaathaugs established that the insurance company had provided
transcripts in violation of the exclusionary rule, the burden shifted to the insurance company to
show the content of the transcripts provided and that the violation could not have had any effect
on the verdict. Jd.
The facts of Slaathaug are analogous to the instant case. Rich County's First Motion
alleges that the Plaintiff engaged in misconduct by engaging in extensive ex parte
communication and contact with Peck. The District Court, as well as the Plaintiff, admits that
this behavior was improper and should never have occurred. Therefore, Rich County has met its
burden under the first prong of the Rueth analysis. It is then the Plaintiff's burden to show both
the content of these communications and that the misconduct could not have affected the trial's
outcome.
Just as the insurance company in Slaathaug was in the best position to explain the details
of their misconduct, the Plaintiff is one of only two people who actually knows and can explain
the substance of his ex parte communications with Peck. No one was present during the ex parte

13
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contacts except for the Plaintiff and Peck. Even the Court was unaware as to the precise details
of these conversations because it received its information second-hand, by overhearing a
discussion between court staff members in chambers. It is only logical that the Plaintiff here
must bear the burden of showing what those communications were.
Moreover, as the party that engaged in the misconduct, the Plaintiff bears the burden of
proving that the communications could not have had any effect on the jury. The District Court
erroneously based its substantive determination on Rich County's failure to affirmatively prove
that the ex parte communication caused prejudice or improper jury influence, but this is not what
the Rueth standard requires. Instead, the Plaintiff must show that his misconduct could not have
had any impact on the jury and/or prevented Rich County from having a fair trial. See Slaathaug,
979 P.2d at 112 (emphasis added).
E.

The Plaintiff Failed to Show that the Communication Could Not Have Affected the
Trial's Outcome.

The District Court abused its discretion when it concluded that the ex parte
communications did not affect the trial's integrity or prevent either party from having a fair trial
because the Plaintiff failed to meet the minimum showings under Rueth's four-prong analysis.
The Plaintiff did not sufficiently demonstrate the content of the ex parte communications such
that the District Court could even begin to determine their potential prejudicial impact. The
information that the Plaintiff did disclose regarding the communications suggests that these
improper communications very likely may have denied Rich County a fair trial.
For example, the Plaintiff and Peck testified that they did not remember the specifics of
their communications, but the only specific conversations that either of them could recall was
once where Peck asked the Plaintiff about how he felt the trial was going, and once where the
Plaintiff mentioned to Peck that he was "frustrated" with the trial and was happy to have Peck's
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"smiling face." Tr. Hr'g, November 18, 2010, p. 36-37 & 41. There is no question that the
Plaintiff and Peck discussed the trial on at least two occasions and this totally inappropriate
exchange of information between the Plaintiff and a member of the Court's staff could very well
have made its way to the Jury7.
In Slaathaug, the trial court first considered the possible methods for cunng the
defendant's misconduct8 but concluded that all of these methods were no longer available
because the misconduct was only revealed after trial. The trial court granted the Slaathaugs'
motion for a new trial for two reasons. First, "[t]he prejudice to the plaintiff is difficult, if not
impossible, to measure because there is no way of knowing what the testimony would have been
had the violation not occurred," and thus a new trial is a more suitable remedy than those that
would have been available during trial. Id. Also, "[o]rdering a new trial...serves as a deterrent
"to discourage future violations .... " !d.
Rich County and Plaintiffs counsel only became aware of Plaintiffs and the trial court's
staff s improper conduct after the trial. The District Court had the opportunity to make Rich
County and the Plaintiff s counsel aware of the situation during the trial, but for whatever reason
chose not to. This was the District Court's first abuse of discretion, because in failing to disclose
the inappropriate conduct and allowing the parties to voice their objection when something could
have feasibly been done to correct the situation, the District Court effectively denied Rich
County a fair trial.

7 The juror affidavits referred to in Respondent's Brief were stricken by the Court and are not
part of the Clerk's Record for this Appeal. These affidavits are therefore irrelevant and it was
improper for the Plaintiff to mention them in his Brief.
8 The remedies listed by the trial court were: 1) citing the violating witness for contempt, 2)
permitting the injured party to comment on the violation, 3) refusing to let the violating witness
testify, and 4) striking the violating witness' testimony. Id., at 112.
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The District Court also abused its discretion in determining, without any evidence to
support such a conclusion, that the misconduct was only "harmless error." Much like the
situation in Slaathaug, there is no way of knowing whether or to what extent the Plaintiff's
inappropriate relationship with Peck was known by jury or influenced the ultimate result of the
trial and thus Rich County should have been granted a new trial under the Rueth analysis.
Moreover, the District Court's decision does nothing to deter future misconduct on the part of
parties or its own court staff. Judge Brown acknowledged that Peck was not truthful to him
during the trial when she told him that she had ended the ex parte contacts with the Plaintiff.
Obviously Judge Brown's admonitions alone were pitifully insufficient to stop her improper
behavior. At this point, the Plaintiff has essentially gotten away with breaking what should have
been an obvious rule, that being to refrain from personal, ex parte communications and a
relationship with the trial court. This Court should not allow such behavior in Idaho's district
courts, particularly to the very likely detriment of innocent parties.

III.
Motion to Strike Rich County's Second Motion for New Trial
A.

The District Court's Reading of the Kuhn Decision is Material to Rich County's
Appeal.
With respect to Rich County's Motion for New Triae ("Second Motion"), the issue on

appeal is whether the District Court erred in granting the Plaintiff's Motion to Strike Rich
County's Motion for New Trial based upon its reliance on Kuhn v. Coldwell Banker Landmark,
245 P.3d 992 (Idaho 2010). The District Court's decision was expressly and solely based its

9 This Motion, as filed, is entitled "Rich County's Motion for New Trial or Alternatively for
Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict." Although these two issues were raised in a single
motion, Section III of Appellant's Reply Brief only pertains to the first part, that being the
Motion for New Trial.
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determination that Kuhn overruled the Court's holding in Nations, (Nations v. Bonner Bldg.

Supply, 746 P.2d 1027 (Idaho Ct. App. 1987», which was actually cited by the Plaintiff in
support of his position that Rich County's Motion should be stricken. The District Court
explained:
"[I]fthe analysis were complete with the Court's reading and interpretation of Nations,
the Court would conclude that it was within the Court's discretion to determine whether
or not to dismiss the motion for new trial or strike the same as requested by Athay. The

Court would also refuse Athay's request to strike based upon the logic and holding in
Nation[s 1."
R., p. 507 (emphasis added).
The Plaintiff agrees that the District Court was incorrect in concluding that Kuhn
overruled Nations. Respondent's Brief, pp. 27-32. Absent the District Court's erroneous
conclusion that Kuhn overruled Nations, it would not have granted the Plaintiffs Motion to
Strike and would have considered the merits of Rich County's Second Motion. An erroneous
conclusion of law is not a matter of discretion. Therefore, this Court should reverse the District
Court's decision on the Plaintiffs Motion to Strike and remand for consideration of the Second
Motion's substantive arguments.
B.

The District Court Would Not Have Abused its Discretion if it had Denied the
Plaintiff's Motion to Strike.
Rich County does not contend that the particularity requirement does not apply to

motions for a new trial made pursuant to I.R.C.P. 59(a)(6) or (7). Instead, the issue is whether the
particularity requirement must be satisfied within the time period set forth in I.R.C.P. 59(b). As
the District Court explained, Nations states that there is nothing in Rule 59 or in the case law that
requires that the particular grounds supporting a motion for a new trial be set forth in the motion
itself or within the 14-day time period in Rule 59(b). The Plaintiff has not cited a single case or
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advanced any convincing argument to the contrary, nor does the Plaintiff contend that Kuhn or
any other subsequent case overruled Nations.
There is no question that Rich County did, in fact, satisfy Rule 59's particularity
requirement in its Memorandum in Support of the Second Motion, which was filed within the
time limits set forth in I.R.C.P. 7. The District Court accepted Rich County's Memorandum and
heard oral argument on the Motion. The Plaintiff was provided the requisite opportunity to
review the Memorandum, prepare a response, and argue his Opposition. Therefore, it would have
been appropriate for the District Court, in its discretion, to deny the Plaintiff's Motion to Strike
and consider Rich County's substantive arguments advanced in its second Motion as it stated it
would have but for its incorrect interpretation of Kuhn. Since the parties agree that Kuhn did not
overrule Nations, this Court should reverse the District Court's decision to strike the Second
Motion and remand for consideration of its substantive issues.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, and those reasons contained in Appellant 's Brieffor Rich

County, Utah, Appellant Rich County respectfully requests that this Court reverse the District
Court's decisions as to Rich County's Motion to Disqualify and First Motion for a New Trial.
The facts indicate that the District Court's decisions were based upon biased analysis of
procedural issues and were clearly an abuse of its discretion. Appellant further respectfully
requests that this Court reverse the District Court's decisions striking Rich County's Second
Motion for a New Trial because the parties agree that this decision was solely based on an
erroneous legal conclusion. Finally, since there was insufficient evidence introduced at trial to
support the Jury's finding that Stacey acted with reckless disregard, this Court should reverse the
District Court's denial of Rich County's Alternative Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the
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Verdict. Accordingly, this court should correct the errors in the record and set aside the verdict
and order a new trial.
DATED this

2"3

day of November, 2011.
PIKE HERNDON STOSICH & JOHNSTON

By:

ALAN JOHNSTON
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant
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